(2) Promote the improvement uniswap v3 collectand expansion of service consumption in multiple fields
Business conditionsetherscan hashmasksBusiness data
Token value captureCore function: revenue accelerationUp to now, the main function of QBT is to obtain qScore after lock-up. Through qScore, deposit users can accelerate their deposit income (from the increase in QBT deposit subsidies).This mechanism is similar to Curve's Locker mechanism. Curve's Locker function and economic model consolidate its original competitive advantage and increase the switching cost of liquidity providers and investors. It is a very eye-catching design. However, when the mechanism is applied to a loan agreement, will it still have a good effect? The author remains skeptical about this.First of all, the reason why some people are willing to lock up the position of Curve's token CRV for a long time after buying it is caused by Curve's strong position in the stable asset business chain and the competition for the governance power of Curve by multiple participants. Because governance power on the Curve platform means two core resources: the baton of liquidity and the accelerator of revenue.
Since the issuer of stable consideration assets (stable currency, stETH and other pledge certificates and renBTC and other BTC cross-chain assets are stable consideration assets), they have great requirements on the stability and transaction depth of their operating assets, so they choose Curve to list. Assets and attracting market-making liquidity are very rigid requirements, which creates a strong position of Curve relative to asset operators, which is determined by the business positioning of its Top1 stable asset exchange platform.In terms of the expansion of asset lending scenarios, the demand from asset operators is far less strong, which results in a large number of less demanders for Qubit governance rights, and the overall lock-up willingness is difficult to reach the level of Curve."External validators and federalism" are generally better in terms of state and connectivity because they can trigger transactions, store data, and allow data to interact with any number of target chains. However, this comes at the cost of security, because by definition, users rely on the security of the bridge rather than the source or target chain. Although most of the current external validator mechanisms are based on trust models, some require collateralized assets, and a subset of assets is used to insure end users. Unfortunately, their insurance mechanisms are usually reflexive. If the agreement token is used as collateral, it is assumed that the value of the token is sufficient to compensate the user's loss. In addition, if the mortgage asset is different from the insurance asset, it will also depend on the price flow of the oracle, so the security of the bridge will be downgraded to that of the oracle. If a trust model is not required, these bridges are also the least capital efficient, because they promote economic throughput and also need to scale up the scale of collateral.
"Light client and relay" is also better in terms of state, because the block header relay system can transmit any type of data. Although there are liveness assumptions due to the need for repeaters to transmit information, they are also very safe because they do not require additional trust assumptions. At the same time, they are the most capital efficient bridges because there is no need to lock any assets. However, these advantages come at the expense of connectivity. Every time a pair of chains is connected, the developer must deploy a new light client smart contract on the source chain and the target chain. The complexity of the contract is between O(LogN) and O(N) (the reason is between this The scope is because it is relatively easy to add chain support using the same consensus algorithm). There is also a significant speed flaw in the optimistic model that relies on fraud proofs, which may increase the delay to 4 hours."Liquidity networks" are strong in terms of security and speed because they are locally verified systems (that is, global consensus is not required). They are also more capital efficient than the external validator mechanism of the mortgage/insurance mechanism, because capital efficiency is related to transaction flow/volume, rather than security. For example, assuming that the transaction flows of the two chains are equal, and given a built-in rebalancing mechanism, the liquidity network can contribute to an arbitrarily large economic throughput.The trade-off lies in the state, because although the call data can be transmitted, its function is limited. For example, they can interact with data across chains, where the receiver has the right to interact based on the provided data (for example, using the signature information from the sender to call a smart contract), but there is no "owner" of the data for the transmission or the transmission belongs to Generalized state data (such as minting representative tokens) is not helpful.Building a strong cross-chain bridge is a difficult problem in distributed systems. Although there have been many attempts in this field, there are still some problems to be solved:
Finality & rollbacks: In a chain with probabilistic finality, how does bridging deal with block reorganization and time thief attacks? For example, if any chain has experienced a state rollback, what will happen to users who send themselves from Polkadot to Ethereum?NFT transfers & provenance: How can bridges trace the provenance of NFT across multiple chains? For example, if there is an NFT that has transacted in multiple markets of Ethereum, Flow, and Solana, how are all these transactions and owners recorded?
Stress testing: In the case of chain congestion or protocol and network level attacks, how will various bridge designs respond?Although bridging unlocks more innovation possibilities for the blockchain ecosystem, if the team takes shortcuts in R&D, it may also bring great risks. The Poly Network cross-chain attack event has shown us the potential economic loss scale of vulnerabilities and attacks, and I estimate that there will be more large-scale attacks in the future. Although for bridge builders, the current network is highly fragmented and competition is fierce. But each team should be highly self-disciplined and prioritize security rather than release speed.Although the ultimate ideal state is to build a "isomorphic bridge" shared by all things, the reality is that there is probably no single "best" bridge design. Different types of bridges will be suitable for different specific applications (such as asset transfer, contract invocation, token minting, etc.).In addition, the best bridge should be the most secure, connectable, fast, capital efficient, cost-effective, and censorship-resistant. If we want to realize the vision of the "blockchain internet", these attributes need to be maximized by us.
So far, we have not constructed the optimal bridge. There are several interesting research directions for all bridging types:Reducing the cost of block header verification: The cost of block header verification for light clients is very high. If this problem can be solved, it will bring us closer to achieving fully universal and trustless interoperability. An interesting design is to bridge to L2 to reduce these costs. For example, implement the Tendermint light client on zkSync.Shift from a trust-based model to a mortgage model: Although the capital efficiency of mortgage verifiers is much lower, the security of "social contracts" is not enough to protect billions of dollars in user funds. In addition, the fancy threshold signature mechanism does not reduce trust; this group of signers still belongs to a trusted third party. Without collateral, users actually hand over their assets to an external custodian.Change from a mortgage model to an insurance model: Loss of assets is the last thing users want to encounter. Although verifiers and repeaters of mortgage assets can prevent malicious behavior to a certain extent, the agreement should go further and directly use the confiscated funds to compensate users.
Expanding the liquidity of the liquidity network: The "liquidity network" can be said to be the fastest bridge for asset transfer, and there are some interesting design trade-offs between trust and liquidity. For example, the liquidity network may be able to use the mortgage verifier model to outsource capital supply, where routing may also be a threshold multi-signature with mortgage liquidity.Bridge aggregation: Although the use of bridges may follow the law of exponential for a specific asset, an aggregator like Li Finance can improve the experience of developers and end users.
Nowadays, many GameFi projects continue to emerge, and provide a variety of participation methods and play-to-earn and pledge functions. So, how to judge which projects can be held for a long time and can add value? How to find potential NFT agreements?The calculation of agreement income is the focus of value investment.
First of all, let's take a look at what is the agreement income? What is the difference with income?Let me talk about the definition of revenue. Revenue measures the return of all participants, that is, the total cost paid to the contract supplier. For example, the fees paid to liquidity providers in AMM, the transaction fees of decentralized exchanges, and the amount of interest on the lending platform in DeFi. Revenue is obtained by charging a rate to the total flow of the agreement. Simply put, revenue refers to the total fees paid by end users of blockchain or decentralized applications. These revenues will eventually be distributed to token holders, liquidity holders and protocol libraries.GMV (Gross merchandise volume) refers to the total flow of the agreement, which represents the transaction volume of the blockchain or the transaction volume and borrowing volume of decentralized applications. For decentralized exchanges, GMV is the total transaction volume, and for lending agreements, GMV is the total borrowing volume.The fee rate is the fee charged to GMV, which can be the transaction fee of the blockchain, the transaction fee of Dapp, or the interest rate of the loan.Income calculation formula:GMV * Take Rate = Revenue
Total transaction volume * rate = project revenue (total fees paid)The total revenue is distributed between the agreement and its Token holders and supplier participants (miners/validators, liquidity providers, lenders, etc.). For early-stage projects, 100% of the revenue is usually distributed directly to supplier participants. In the long run, the revenue sharing model will be more diversified, and the agreement and its owners can also get a share of the total revenue.
Agreement revenue represents the cash flow of the agreement. The agreement collects costs from users and is calculated as a percentage of total revenue.The difference between agreement income and income
Revenue is the amount that users pay for the use of the contracted service. These revenues are obtained by the supplier participants who provide the basic service, and the contractual revenue refers to the amount of revenue actually obtained by the Token. This actually represents the bottom value of the agreement, which is the profit margin. In other words, just as early-stage startups and growth companies do not pay dividends to shareholders, not every agreement allocates cash flow to Token.Cost refers to how much of the agreement income is used for grants, wages, and audit fees. That is, the sum of all costs and expenses paid according to the implemented on-chain governance recommendations.
Income: How much funds are distributed to Token holders as dividends, ie = agreement income-cost and difference.To sum up in one sentence, revenue is the amount that users pay to the agreement, which is mainly the income brought by the provider of the underlying service, and the agreement income is the cumulative income brought by Token. Agreement revenue represents profit and is the basis of the agreement.The agreement income of each project depends on the fee structure of the agreement itself. Different income models complicate the calculation of agreement income. Below is an overview of the agreement revenue calculations for four NFT and DeFi projects.How is agreement income distributed to token holders?
Take the example of MakerDao. Makerdao issues Dai to collateral providers, and users need to repay the principal and pay fees when unlocking the collateral. After the fees are paid to the agreement, they will be accumulated in the agreement's internal balance sheet. When the accumulated fees reach 10,000,000u Dai, they will be auctioned to obtain the agreement's governance token MKR. After that, MKR is burned (aka destroyed), thereby reducing the circulation of MKR. This process will be repeated continuously.Participants of agreement income
The four types of participants in the distribution agreement income are classified as follows:Any supplier participant (LP, lender, miner, keeper/liquidator);
Any demand-side participant (DSR depositor, Nexus Mutual claimant);Supplier participants who own tokens (PoS verifier, 0x MM, Keep signer);
Token owner;Case: Axie Infinity agreement revenue calculationIn the past, Axie Infinity’s income came from land sales, Axie sales, transaction platform fees, and breeding fees. According to the old white paper of Axie Infinity, the Axie Infinity ecosystem has generated more than 6000 ETH in revenue.Axie Infinity will operate using a game-as-a-service model, and new features will be introduced over time. Axie can earn income by selling Axies, land, cosmetics, and in-game consumables. In addition, when players want to upgrade their game characters, participate in tournaments, and create new assets, fees will be charged.
Once the pledge dashboard is activated, the community finance department will begin to accumulate fees. All expenses and income generated by Axie Infinity will be deposited in a community vault managed by AXS holders.Currently, these are the main expenses in the Axie field:
The breeding fee is paid by AXS and used to breed Axies.14.25% of the Axie market expenses are derived from the successful sale of Axie NFT assets: Axies, land and land projects.
Axie Infinity has multiple sources of income. For example, every time you buy and sell Axie bio, you need to pay 4.25% of the market fee. The second source of income is the cost of 4 AXS (currently changed to 2AXS), which is used to breed Axies to create new pets. With the influx of new users every day, purchase and reproduction, the pressure is increasing, which creates a large number of charging opportunities.As of September 14, AXS hit a record high of $95. A nearly 33-fold increase in three months. Analyzing the reasons, there are the following points: